The war arithmetic is as simple as it’s gruesome. The Russians are suffering casualties at a rapid rate, about 2,000 a day. The Ukraine’s casualties are lower, but we don’t know how much.
However, Russia’s population is over three times the size of the Ukraine’s. This means that, even if the Russian casualties are twice as high, the Ukraine is going to be exsanguinated first.
That’s why the Ukraine is bound to lose any war of attrition, and her only chance of victory lies in marrying her superior generalship and fighting spirit with better and more plentiful armaments. These have to come from the West, but after almost three years little doubt remains that the West won’t keep up its end.
Western supplies come in a trickle sufficient to keep the Ukraine in the fight but far short of what it would take for her to win. Hence the Hobson’s choice facing Zelensky. He either has to fight to the last soldier or negotiate the best peace terms he can get.
These are just general observations. No one outside the Ukrainian high command knows the true state of affairs. Western intelligence services have a vague idea, but even they are short of hard data. The overarching question is, How long can the Ukraine hold out given the present level of supplies and the dwindling numbers of recruits?
Our spooks don’t really know, and I know considerably less. However, judging by the overtures Zelensky made yesterday, the general picture isn’t bright.
For the first time since 24 February, 2022, Zelensky said last night that he was ready to trade territory for peace. One assumes the area he has in mind is the 20 per cent of the country currently occupied by Russian invaders.
By itself, that’s not such a bad deal. Both countries will be able to declare victory: Russia, because it will have succeeded in grabbing a chunk of land; the Ukraine, because Russia will have failed in her real objective of stamping out the Ukraine’s sovereignty and spreading fascism over a greater part of Europe.
But nothing in wartime diplomacy is ever ‘by itself’. The subtext is often more important than the text, and long-term perspectives can throw a shadow over any agreements.
Regarded in that light, Zelensky’s statement smacks of desperation. He gives every impression of a leader who knows his country is losing a war.
Zelensky knows, and so does everyone else, that no lasting peace with an aggressive predator is ever possible. What’s possible is a temporary cessation of hostilities giving the aggressor time to regroup and pounce again.
Under the terms mooted by Zelensky the Ukraine will get to keep 80 per cent of her real estate. But what’s the guarantee that Putin won’t come back for it later? The solution suggested by Zelensky would be naïve if it weren’t so desperate.
“If we want to stop the hot stage of the war, we should take under the Nato umbrella the territory of Ukraine that we have under our control,” he said. He then added the words that should sadden everyone who detests Putin’s fascism: “’We need to do it fast.”
That sounds like “before we run out of soldiers”, and I hope I’m misinterpreting the subtext. And what kind of umbrella does he have in mind?
Zelensky hinted he knows that full NATO membership isn’t on the cards. Instead he wants NATO’s key members, such as the US, Britain, France, Germany and perhaps Poland, to provide security guarantees. Excellent idea, that.
I suggest a treaty to that effect should be signed in Budapest and called the Budapest Memorandum… Hold on a moment, I’ve just remembered that such a document already exists. Here it is, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum signed by the US, Britain and Russia that thereby guaranteed the Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange for her giving up nuclear weapons.
How has that worked out for the Ukraine so far? I see. So what’s the basis for hoping that a Budapest Memorandum Mark II, or whatever it will be called, will offer a secure guarantee of lasting peace? No basis at all, and Zelensky knows this.
And yet he came up with that proposal, adding that in due course (when Putin croaks?) the Ukraine would reclaim the ceded territory “by diplomatic means”. But Putin doesn’t do diplomacy; he only does blackmail. Since Zelensky is well aware of this, his denotation is meaningless here, and the connotation reigns supreme.
So let’s try to guess what the connotation might be. It’s fairly obvious that hush-hush tripartite conversations are going on involving Putin, Zelensky and the Trump team, with NATO acting in strictly an advisory capacity.
The starting point is Trump’s braggadocio that he’ll end the war on day one, and only my aversion to puns prevents my describing that promise as trumpery. The idea Trump dangled before the interested parties involves freezing the existing front line and creating a buffer DMZ enforced by NATO troops.
Now, Putin used NATO’s eastward expansion as the casus belli. Hence it’s not immediately clear how he’ll explain to the Russians that getting NATO troops at, rather than merely close to, Russian borders is the outcome he has always wanted.
It’s true that fascist dictators don’t necessarily seek public consensus for their actions, but Putin’s hold on his populace does depend on a projection of strength. With rampant inflation racing towards 15 per cent and the dollar heading for the 120-rouble mark, the Russians are getting poorer by the day.
Putin’s propagandists reassure them that the collapsing rouble is a good thing because it makes Russian exports so much more lucrative. That’s true, and I can see Milton Friedman flash an avuncular smile of pride from his grave. However, what’s also true is that, pari passu with exports getting more profitable, imports are getting more ruinous, and most things worth buying in Russia are imported.
The time-dishonoured stratagem of their rulers is to assure the people that all the privations are temporary and more than made up for by Russia’s muscular presence in the world (and of course her unmatched spirituality, that much goes without saying). Hence Putin can’t afford to appear weak, because if he does, he may find his power base crumbling away.
That’s why I can’t for the life of me see him agreeing to Trump’s plan – unless, and there is a big unless there somewhere. It comes from the question Putin has to be asking: “What’s in this for me?”
Trump isn’t yet in a position to provide a satisfactory answer, and won’t be until 20 January. But I’m sure he and his emissaries are dipping their legs, not just toes, in the water.
What will it take? they must be asking. Summary removal of all sanctions? War reparations from NATO (mostly meaning the US)? Russia’s readmission into every international body from which she was expelled? Favourable trade terms? Reinstatement of deals to buy Russian raw materials, especially fossil fuels? The Ukraine’s neutrality and acceptance of de facto Russian control (‘finlandisation’, as such an arrangement used to be called)? Recognition of Eastern Europe as a Russian sphere of influence? All of the above?
I don’t know what’s on the table, but something must be for Zelensky even to imply what he seems to have implied. I suppose we’ll find out soon enough – the Ukrainian president did say time is of the essence.