The mystery of a leaking pipeline

Against the background of Russian and Muslim terrorists murdering Ukrainians and Israelis, it seems churlish to talk about a leaking pipeline. So it would be if the incident weren’t related to the on-going slaughter.

The pipeline in question connects Finland and Estonia. About 50 miles of it run under the Baltic Sea, entirely in Nato waters, and it was there that the leak occurred during the night of 7-8 October.

That’s when the first alarm bell ought to sound: It was on 7 October that HAMAS struck. Was that a coincidence?

The Finnish authorities immediately announced they had reason to suspect that the leak in Balticconnector may have been caused by “external actions”. Another word for such actions is sabotage, something – and you can’t refute this ironclad logic – caused by saboteurs.

However, this situation was different from the Nord Stream incident last year. There seismologists detected two distinct blasts, but this time around they didn’t measure any such activity – at first.

However, the next day Norwegian seismologists reported an explosion they had detected near Balticconnector that very night. Its magnitude of 1 was lower than the Nord Stream explosion, but high enough to punch a hole in a pipe.

This brings sabotage and possible saboteurs back into focus, and, just as with Nord Stream, everybody knows who the culprits are. Yet “everyone knows” isn’t seen as forensic proof in Western jurisprudence. We need prima facie evidence to point an accusing finger at anyone.

Now what would constitute such evidence in this case? Photographs or video footage of frogmen diving off a Russian ship? Tearful confessions of the remorseful officials involved? Putin banging his fist down and hissing “I’ve taught the bloody Finns a lesson”?

We have no such proof, and I can confidently predict we’ll never have it. Yet strategic decisions on enemy action shouldn’t require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. That’s a standard for criminal courts to use, not for government ministers and their generals.

Such people are neither detectives nor prosecutors. Their stock in trade isn’t exposing a crime to a jury’s satisfaction but punishing it to protect their citizens from a repeat performance. To put such measures on line it’s sufficient to establish guilt on the balance of probabilities.

And when the probabilities in this case are weighed in the balance, just one suspect emerges. Only Russia had the motive and opportunity to sabotage Nato infrastructure in the Baltic.

Several Russian ships were in the immediate vicinity when the explosion occurred. One of them, a freighter, was moored there. Diving overboard and attaching explosive charges to the pipe would have been a simple matter, especially considering the on-the-job experience Russians acquired at Nord Stream.

The motive part is equally straightforward, and it’s made up of several subsets. One is to punish Finland for her hasty decision to join Nato last year. The country, along with Sweden, applied for membership in May, 2022, just three months after Russia’s full-scale attack on the Ukraine.

A stream of spittle-covered threats instantly emanated from the Kremlin. The general thrust was to tell those new members that the Nato aegis would make them less, not more, secure. Yet, as the old proverb goes, “it’s better to see something once than to hear about it a thousand times’. That makes sabotaging the pipeline a visual aid to an important lesson.

The terrorist attack on Nord Stream in September last year was part of Russia’s concerted effort to make Europe freeze through the winter. For, like a drug pusher, Russia had made Europe, especially Germany, addicted to her cheap gas.

When the first sanctions began to bite, Russia had to make Europe suffer the pain of having to go cold turkey. Acting in the same spirit, the terrorist Russian state intensified its attacks on the Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, trying to leave 40 million people without heat during a typically inclement winter.

The potential effect of the current blast is less damaging because Finland is less dependent on gas in her energy mix. Still, the Russians may feel this is a warning shot across the country’s bows.

This time around, they seem to be saying, you’ll only have to pay a little more for your energy, but next time… Well, you know the rest if you’ve ever seen a gangster film.

Another, strategically more telling, motive is to test Nato’s resolve. After all, under attack there was the critical infrastructure of two Nato countries, supposed to feel secure under the protection of Article 5.

If that was indeed a test, I’m afraid Nato failed it. Last year, when Nord Stream was blown up, Russia was instantly identified as the likely culprit, and Western papers screamed that off their front pages in huge type.

This time around the word ‘Russia’ wasn’t even mentioned, and the stories were buried where few readers were likely to see them. And all the official statements were circumspect.

Thus EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised she would “strongly condemn any act of deliberate destruction of critical infrastructure. Our pipelines and underwater cables connect citizens and companies across Europe and to the rest of the world. They are lifelines of financial markets and global trade.”

A commendable sentiment, that. However, for my taste, it lacks specificity. Any suspects, ma’am? In fact, any suspicions?

As I said earlier, the list of potential suspects includes only one entry. After all, Nato countries blowing up their own pipelines is as unlikely as Prigozhin pulling out a grenade’s safety pin aboard his plane.

The Baltic is now a water feature in Nato’s backyard, with only one non-member having access. This may all be circumstantial, but people have been sent to the gallows on less evidence.

Vague statements of concern simply won’t do – the time for generalities has passed. Terrorists, coming from large countries or smallish enclaves, are attacking the West on a broad front, giving a whole new meaning to what the Russians call hybrid warfare.

As a minimum, the West should respond by pulling all the stops out in the flow of aid to the victim countries, while punishing the terrorists no matter who they are and where they strike.

In this case, the sanctions on Russia should be replaced with a total embargo on Russian goods. Terrorist states and smaller entities should get a taste of their own medicine: let them eat drones and Kalashnikovs.

Israel is showing the way by cutting off the supply of electricity and food to Gaza, and a similar strategy, mutatis mutandis, can work against Russia. She may be more self-sufficient than HAMAS, but not infinitely so.

At the same time, third parties should be told in no uncertain terms that they should choose whose trade partner they’d rather be, Russia’s or the West’s. One precludes the other, and no exceptions will be tolerated.

But to begin with let’s acknowledge publicly and in large type that the leak in Balticconnector is no mystery. We know who caused it, how and why.